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Abstract:   
Research on the effects of informal child fostering arrangements on the welfare of the 
children involved highlights cross-country disparities. Why may there be differences 
across countries with regard to the effects of informal child fostering arrangements? If in 
all countries reporting a high incidence of foster children Hamilton’s rule applies, then 
these cross-country differences are puzzling. Our model of child fostering arrangements 
builds on the fact that a child’s school performance is jointly influenced by his nutrition 
status and the time he has available at home to develop his learning skills and prepare 
for national school tests. Given this feature of academic performance, fostering out may 
become a poor parent’s best option for enhancing his child’s academic excellence, by 
trading off study time for better nutrition. We show that child fostering arrangements 
embedding this human capital motive for out-fostering make the foster child better off 
when nutrition is paramount to a child’s ability to achieve academic excellence. 
 
Keywords: Child Fostering, Child Nutrition, Foster Child’s Welfare 
 
JEL Classification: D13, J13, O12, O15 
 
1. Introduction
Informal child fostering arrangements are voluntary and reversible transfers of children’s
residence from parents to non-parents within extended family networks. These arrange-
ments are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, though their occurrence is not restricted to
this region.1 If altruistic actions are restricted to beneﬁciaries that are closely related to
actors, as Hamilton’s rule suggests, then developing countries’ ongoing tolerance of this
informal institution need to be explained.
Research on the eﬀects of fostering arrangements on the welfare of the children in-
volved was pioneered by Ainsworth (1990 and 1996) who ﬁnds evidence in Cote d’Ivoire
that these arrangements adversely aﬀect the welfare of foster children. The validity of
this ﬁnding, however, was subsequently rejected by Zimmerman (2003) who ﬁnds evidence
that foster children in South Africa are not at a disadvantage compared to biological chil-
dren, in terms of enrolment rates. But school enrolment rates by themselves are no hard
evidence of fostered children’s success at accumulating human capital. How these children
perform in national tests at the end of primary and secondary education, for example,
may actually matter more than school attendance.
The ensuing debate on the welfare eﬀects of child fostering unfortunately highlights a
lack of consensus among scholars seeking to improve our understanding of this informal
institution: whereas Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) corroborate Ainsworth’s ﬁnding in a
case study of Nepal, Akresh (2009), by contrast, corroborates Zimmerman’s based upon
an empirical analysis of child fostering arrangements in Burkina Faso. Arguably, these
mixed results suggest the existence of cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects child fostering
arrangements have on the welfare of the children involved. Why may there be diﬀerences
across countries with regard to the eﬀects of informal child fostering arrangements? If in
all countries reporting a high incidence of foster children such arrangements are restricted
to a temporary migration of children within extended family networks, and Hamilton’s
rule equally applies to all these environments, then these cross-country diﬀerences are
puzzling. This paper is primarily concerned with explaining this puzzle.
We propose a theoretical analysis of adults’ decision to participate in child fostering ar-
rangements in the context where parental altruistic actions are restricted to own-children.
Several factors can be linked to the decision to foster a child. First, in the absence of
a well-functioning market for domestic labor services such as cooking, cleaning, water-
fetching, etc., participating in a fostering arrangement may allow a family to improve
the welfare of its members by fostering in child domestic labor. On one hand, domestic
labor by the foster child (hereafter referred to as in-foster) may partially substitute for
1See Zimmerman 2003 for a review of evidence on the prevalence of this institution in Africa.
2
the foster parents’ labor input in household chores, thus allowing them to achieve a high
degree of specialization in market activities that increase family income. On the other
hand, the in-foster’s labor may also alleviate the biological child’s domestic workload,
thus allowing the latter to allocate more time to after-school learning activities such as
reviewing daily school lessons, studying for national school tests, reading magazines and
books to improve his vocabulary.
Observe that since household chores (e.g., water-fetching, cleaning, or running er-
rands) can be undertaken before or after school, they need not preclude school attendance
by the in-foster. Therefore, for parents too poor to educate their own children, fostering
some of them out to extended family members can become an attracting strategy for
enhancing their human capital accumulation. An important contribution of this paper is
to highlight the interplay in a child human capital formation between his nutrition status
and the time he has available for engaging in after-school learning activities.
There is ample evidence that proper nutrition is key to children’s ability to function
and learn, as shown within the economics literature by Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and
Alderman, Behrman, Lavy, and Rekha (1997). In the public health literature, Brown,
Beardslee, and Prothrow-Stith (2008) also corroborate these ﬁndings based on a review
of a large number of research contributions focusing on the eﬀects of child nutrition on
academic excellence in school. Likewise, there is also evidence that academic excellence in
school begins at home, where parents set a good learning environment for their children,
giving them adequate time to organize for national tests, review daily lessons, or put
out sustained eﬀort to improve their writing and math skills (Pohlsen 1984). In a case
study of school performances in the Thiruvananthapuram District of the Indian State
of Kerala, for example, Nair, Mini, and Padmamohan (2003) ﬁnd that not allocating
enough studying time to reviewing daily lessons was an important factor of poor school
performance among adolescents. In our model, household chores and after-school learning
activities have a competing claim on a child’s non-schooling time.
By stressing child’s nutrition status and child’s time allocated to after-school learning
activities as joint determinants of a child’s human capital, our theory of child fostering
arrangements opens up the possibility that parental out-fostering strategies are aﬀected by
the intertwined concerns for both adequate child nutrition and studying time for school.
On one hand, domestic child labor by the in-foster directly or indirectly enhances the
foster family ability to provide its members with proper nutrition. But, on the other hand,
if excessive, the foster child’s involvement in household chores may hamper his school
performance by reducing the time he has available for after-school learning activities. We
argue that this trade-oﬀ has implications for the eﬀects non-parent residence has on the
human capital of in-fosters.
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To explore these eﬀects, we model the optimal child fostering arrangement as the out-
come of a cooperative game between a sending household and a receiving household over
how much labor time the in-foster is to allocate to household chores. This modeling strat-
egy seems reasonable for two main reasons. First, asymmetric motives for child fostering
generate a potential conﬂict between the receiving household and the sending household,
stemming from the trade-oﬀ between the immediate beneﬁts of child labor to the former
and the future human capital beneﬁts to the latter. It is therefore reasonable to expect
the optimal child fostering arrangement to be one that resolves this conﬂict. Second, as
child fostering is restricted to temporary migration of children within extended family
networks (Zimmerman 2003, Akresh 2009), and reputation and trust are the cornerstone
of such networks, bargaining outcomes are virtually self-enforcing, and thus may need no
external provision of enforcement mechanisms. We show that the optimal child fostering
arrangement unambiguously improves the in-foster’s nutrition status. We also show that,
as a reﬂection of Hamilton’s rule, there are asymmetries in human capital levels between
the in-foster and the biological child, despite equal enrolment in school. Indeed, while
they both enjoy the same nutrition status (Serra 2009), and are both enrolled in school
(Zimmerman 2003), the in-foster, however, has less study time, and always contributes
more time in household chores than does the biological child. Despite this intra-household
inequality due to Hamilton’s rule, our model predicts that to the extent that nutrition is
paramount to a child’s ability to perform in school, non-parent residence brings about a
Pareto-improvement in the in-foster’s human capital relative to own-parent residence.
Numerical simulations of the model indeed highlight necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for the optimal child fostering arrangement to enhance the in-foster’s human capital.
We show that when nutrition is relatively more productive than after-school learning ac-
tivities in a child’s human capital, being fostered out causes a child’s level of human
capital to exceed the level that would have obtained under own-parent residence-a situ-
ation we refer to as autarky. Only when child’s time allocated to after-school learning
activities is relatively more important than nutrition in determining a child’s ability to ac-
cumulate human capital can the fostering arrangement become largely an inter-household
transfer of domestic labor (Ainsworth 1996), a situation that leaves the in-foster worse
oﬀ. This situation can occur, for example, in environments where the quality of in-school
education is too low. Since in most developing countries school children must take na-
tional tests at the end of the primary and secondary education, a poor quality of in-school
education (as reﬂected for example by large pupil-to-teacher ratios, or high incidences of
absenteeism among teachers) can put pressure on parents to provide more study time
for their school-age children, or, better yet, resort to after-school tutoring to increase
their children’s chances of passing the national tests. In such environments, after-school
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learning activities can have a much larger contribution in a child’s human capital than his
nutrition status. Our analysis therefore suggests that in countries where informal child
fostering arrangements have been found to adversely aﬀect the in-foster’s human capital,
the poor quality of the formal education system may be to blame.
This paper draws on the theoretical work of several authors who have previously an-
alyzed the eﬀects of informal child fostering arrangements on the welfare of the children
involved. Whereas Zimmerman (2003) studies child fostering arrangements solely from
the viewpoint of the receiving household, we extend this analysis to include the sending
household as well. This modelling strategy enables us to approach child fostering ar-
rangements as outcomes of cooperative games between sending households and receiving
households. In our model, the object of inter-household bargaining is the level of the
in-foster’s input in domestic labor activities.
Our analysis is closest to Serra (2009), but diﬀers from hers in two important ways.
First, Serra’s analysis is not explicitly concerned with cross-country diﬀerences, and there-
fore cannot be used to understand such diﬀerences. Second, in Serra (2009), foster families
with high socioeconomic status though probably aware of the positive externality they
generate in their in-fosters’ human capital, they make no attempt to extract rents from it.
This view, however, is impervious to her maintained assumption that parental altruistic
actions are restricted to own-children. Indeed, if Hamilton’s rule applies, inter-household
diﬀerences in socioeconomic status can translate into large asymmetries in bargaining
power between the sending, and the receiving, household. These asymmetries, in turn,
can aﬀect the foster child’s ability to take advantage of the positive externality gener-
ated by non-parent residence in a household with high socioeconomic status. In our
model, given that Hamilton’s rule applies, the optimal fostering arrangement obtains as
the outcome of a cooperative game, in which participating households use the level of
welfare they derive from enforcing own-parent residence for their respective children as
a threat-point. Households with a higher threat-point are more impatient in the negoti-
ation, while those with a low threat-point are more patient. Our numerical simulations
show that in-fosters’ domestic workload is lower when their biological parents have a
suﬃciently high bargaining power. The reverse is true when biological parents have a
suﬃciently low bargaining power. Contrary to Serra (2009) our results are intended (as
opposed to unintended) consequences of the actions of all parties involved.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of
the environment. Section 3 characterizes household welfare and child welfare in autarky
corresponding to the enforcement of own-parent residence for all children. This provides
a benchmark case against which welfare performances of traditional child fostering ar-
rangements can be compared. Section 4 describes a bargaining game of child fostering
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between a sending household and a receiving household. The outcome of this bargain-
ing game is then numerically simulated in section 5 to uncover the welfare properties of
the optimal child fostering arrangement. Section 6 provides concluding remarks, while
section 7 provides proofs of results presented in the main text.
2. Basics
Consider an environment with two diﬀerent types of households in equal number. In-
teractions between households involve the fostering of children. Initially, each household
is composed of a father, a mother, and their unique child. In each household of type
i, income consists of a ﬁxed contribution θi from the father and labor income from the
mother. For simplicity, the father does nothing in this environment other than transfering
funds to his decision-making wife. Each parent has one period left to live, while her child
has two left. A typical mother is endowed with one unit of labor time. She either works at
home, or delivers human capital hmi to ﬁrms. We denote as lmi the fraction of a mother’s
time allocated to household chores, with the remainder going to market-labor. A house-
hold where the mother has attributes (θi, hmi ) is referred to as household i, with i ∈ {1, 2}.
There are three main activities in this environment namely, household production of
a home-made good (z), production of a composite market good (x) by perfectly com-
petitive ﬁrms, and education. Children may engage in the ﬁrst and third activities, and
mothers in the ﬁrst and second. The composite market good is the numeraire.
2.1. Preferences and Budget Constraint
Household i’s preferences are deﬁned over parents’ consumption of the home-made good
(cmi ) and the human capital level of their biological child (hbi). These preferences are
represented by an additively separable utility function:
Ui = ln c
m
i + γb lnh
b
i , (1)
all i, where γb ∈ (0, 1) is the utility weight the mother in household i attributes to its
own child’s wellbeing as measured by the child human capital level hbi .
Denote by s ∈ {b, f} the household status of a child. In any household, a child is either
a biological child (s = b) or a foster child (s = f). Assume all children attend school in
this environment say, due to a compulsory education law. Each child is endowed with
one unit of after school time. There are two competing claims on a child’s after school
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time. It may be used as labor input in home production (lsi ) or to reviewing daily lessons,
studying for school tests, or doing homework. We denote child’s time allocated to after-
school learning activities by 1 − lsi . These activities enhance a child’s ability to achieve
success in school.
Child’s time allocated to after-school learning activities 1− lsi and child’s nutrition status
as determined by the quantity consumed of the home-made-good csi are the only private
inputs into his human capital. Therefore a child with schooling attributes (1− lsi , csi ) will
attain a level of human capital
hsi = D(e
s
i )
λ(csi )
1−λ, (2)
where D > 0 is an education eﬃciency parameter, and λ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the
relative productivity of the time the child spent in after school learning activities.
Let ai ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denote the child fostering decision of household i: ai = −1 corre-
sponds to child out-fostering, ai = 1 to child receiving-household, and ai = 0 means no
fostering, which we refer to as the autarky situation. The number of children residing in
household i thus is 1+ai. For example, in an in-fostering household (ai = 1), the number
of resident children is 2, while the corresponding number is 0 in a sending-household, and
1 in autarky.
Household i’s disposable income including the ﬁxed transfer and the mother’s earned
income is θi + (1 − lmi )hmi , so that total expenditures on the composite market good
satisfy the following budget constraint:
xi ≤ θi + (1− lmi )hmi , (3)
all i.
2.2. Home-Production
The home-made good provides household members with nutritional intakes, and is pro-
duced using the composite market good (x) and household labor (L). For simplicity,
assume the production technology for the home-made good is Cobb-Douglas. Then the
total quantity produced of the home-made good in household i is given by:
zi = [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ]σ (Li)1−σ, (4)
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all i, where σ denotes the relative share of the market good in the production of the
home-made good.
Also for simplicity, assume each resident child consumes a constant relative share α ∈
(0, 1/2) of the home-made good, irrespective of whether he is a biological child (s = b)
or an in-foster(s = f). Therefore, α(1 + ai) denotes the fraction of the home-made good
allocated to children residing in household i, with the parents claiming the remaining
fraction, 1 − α(1 + ai). Combining (3) and (4), we obtain parents’ own-consumption of
the home-made good as follows:
cmi = [1− α(1 + ai)] [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ]σ (Li)1−σ, (5)
while a resident child with status s ∈ {b, f} consumes
csi = α [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ]σ (Li)1−σ, (6)
all s and all i.
Given the fostering decision taken by household i, the labor requirement for the pro-
duction of the home-made good satisﬁes the following constraint: Li = Li(ai), where
Li(ai) = l
m
i +
(1 + ai) [1 + ai(1− ai)]
1 + a2i
lbi +
ai(1 + ai)
2
lfi , (7)
is household i’s total supply of labor given the fostering decision ai, all i. In other
words, if household i chooses to remain in autarky (i.e., ai = 0), total labor input in
home-production is Li(0) = lmi + lbi . In a sending household (i.e., ai = −1), total labor
input in home-production reduces to Li(−1) = lmi ; the comparative ﬁgure for a receiving
household is Li(1) = lmi + lbi + l
f
i . Therefore, if household i follows a fostering strategy
ai ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, its consumption proﬁle will look as follows:
Cmi (ai) = [1− α(1 + ai)] [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ]σ [Li(ai)]1−σ, (8)
Csi (ai) = α [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ]σ [Li(ai)]1−σ . (9)
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3. Household and Child Welfare in Autarky: A
Benchmark
In this section, we characterize a household socioeconomic outcomes, when there is no
child fostering. We want to formalize the motives driving child fostering arrangements.
In particular we ask what forces may cause the emergence of asymmetric motives for
child fostering documented by the empirical literature (e.g., Akresh 2009).
3.1. The Child Labor Motive for In-Fostering
In this subsection, we explore the nature of socioeconomic forces that provide households
with the incentive to foster in children. We start by computing household i’s payoﬀ in
autarky. Deﬁne a real valued function V i : [0, 1]2 ×H ×Θ → R, by:
∀(lmi , lbi , hmi , θi) ∈ [0, 1]2 ×H ×Θ, Ui = V i(lmi , lbi , hmi , θi),
where V i(lmi , lbi , hmi , θi) denotes household i ’s utility from choosing autarky (i.e., ai = 0)
when household total labor input in home-production is Li(0) = lmi + lbi . From (1),
substituting in (2), (7), (8), and (9) and re-arranging terms yields
V i
(
lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi
)
= [1 + γb(1− λ)]
[
σ ln [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ] + (1− σ) ln(lmi + lbi )
]
+B0 + γbλ ln
(
1− lbi
)
,
(10)
where
B0 = ln(1− α) + γb [lnD + (1− λ)lnα] .
Clearly, the level of this utility payoﬀ depends on the household choice of the vector
(lmi , lbi ). In autarky, each household chooses (lmi , lbi ) so as to maximize (10). In other
words, letting (lˆmi , lˆbi ) denote household i’s optimal allocation of labor input in home-
production, we have that
(lˆmi , lˆ
b
i ) = arg max〈lmi ,lbi 〉
V i(lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi). (11)
For each household i, deﬁne ηi = hmi /θi as a measure of the mother’s opportunity cost
of labor input in home-production. The higher ηi, the higher mother i’s forgone income
from trading market-labor for household chores. Using (10), it can be shown that the
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optimal household time-allocation is given by:
lˆbi =
[1 + γb(1− 2λ)]− γbλη−1i
1 + γb
, (12)
eˆbi = 1− lˆbi =
γbλ
1 + γb
(
2 + η−1i
)
, (13)
lˆmi =
[(1− σ)(1 + γb) + σγbλ]
(
1 + η−1i
)− σ [1 + γb(1− λ)]
1 + γb
. (14)
The following proposition can thus be derived from this optimal allocation:
Proposition 1. In a household where the mother faces a high opportunity cost of labor
input in home-production, the child will supply more labor input in home-production and
spend less time in after-school learning activities:
(i)
∂lˆbi
∂ηi
> 0; (ii)
∂eˆbi
∂ηi
< 0.
Proposition 1 obtains because of the substitutability between the mother’s labor input
and the child labor input in home-production. When the mother has a high opportunity
cost of labor input in home-production, this puts more pressure on her child to reduce time
allocated to after school learning activities so as to help produce the home-made good.
Concerns for the child wellbeing may thus provide a household with a high-opportunity
cost mother with the incentive to foster in a child for labor purposes, so as to boost
the biological child’s educational attainment. In other words, in the absence of a well-
functioning market for domestic labor, a mother’s high opportunity cost of labor input
in home-production generates a child labor motive for fostering in a child.
3.2. A Human Capital Motive for Out-Fostering
Why may there be a human capital motive for out-fostering a child? In this subsection,
we characterize the determinants of a child’s human capital level in autarky. Recall that
a child’s human capital is jointly determined by his nutrition status and his after-school’s
time allocated to learning activities. We highlight the role played by nutrition in gener-
ating a human capital motive for fostering out a child.
First, from (9), substituting in (12) and (14) and re-arranging terms yields the child’s
nutrition level as follows:
cˆsi = ασ
σ(1− σ)1−σ [1 + γb(1− λ)]
1 + γb
(
2 + η−1i
)
ησi θ
σ
i , (15)
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all i. Likewise, from (2), substituting in (13) and (15) and re-arranging terms yields the
child human capital level as follows:
hˆbi = φ(λ)
(
2 + η−1i
)
η
σ(1−λ)
i θ
σ(1−λ)
i , (16)
all i, where
φ(λ) ≡ ([ασ
σ(1− σ)1−σ] [1 + γb(1− λ)])1−λ (γbλ)λD
1 + γb
.
The main observation from Eq. (16) is that the opportunity cost of mother i’s labor
input in home-production has two opposite eﬀects on her child’s human capital. One is
a negative eﬀect due to the substitutability between mother’s labor and child labor in
home-production. The other is a positive eﬀect owing to the contribution of the home-
made good to the child’s nutrition– an input in the child’s human capital.
Observe that if nutrition were not an input in a child’s human capital (i.e.,λ = 1),
Eq. (16) would reduce to
hˆbi = φ(1)
(
2 + η−1i
)
,
all i. In that case, a child born of a mother with a high-opportunity cost of labor input
in home-production accumulates less human capital:
∂hbi
∂ηi
< 0.
But to the extent that a child’s ability to achieve academic excellence in school is jointly
determined by his learning activities at home and his nutrition status, living in a house-
hold where the mother has a high opportunity cost of non-market labor therefore need
not adversely aﬀect the child’s human capital. Indeed, a necessary condition for a child
born of a mother with a high-opportunity cost of labor input in home-production to
accumulate more human capital is that nutrition be contributive to the child’s human
capital (i.e., 0 < λ < 1).
To the extent that the composite market good is suﬃciently contributive in the home-
production of nutrition, households where the mother supplies more market-labor may
provide better nutrition for their members. The opportunity to take advantage of the
human capital eﬀects of adequate nutrition may therefore provide a low-opportunity cost
mother with the incentive to foster out her child to a high-opportunity cost mother.
We have argued above that inter-household diﬀerences in the mother’s opportunity cost
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of labor input in home-production combine with the productivity of nutrition as an input
in a child’s human capital to generate potential asymmetric motives for child fostering.
However households will not act upon these motives unless the resulting welfare level
is no less than its autarky level. Therefore, as a benchmark, we compute below each
household’s autarky welfare.
3.3. Household Welfare In Autarky
Deﬁne a real-valued function V¯ : Γ → R, by ∀ηi ∈ Γ,
V¯ (ηi) ≡ max
〈lmi ,lbi 〉
V i(lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi).
We interpret V¯ (ηi) as a measure of household i’s autarky welfare when the mother faces
a level of opportunity cost ηi of labor input in home-production. From (10), substituting
in (12) and (14), re-arranging terms yields mother i’s autarky welfare level as follows:
V¯ (ηi) = B¯0 + (1 + γb) ln
(
2 + η−1i
)
+ σ [1 + γb(1− λ)] ln ηiθi, (17)
all i, where
B¯0 = B0 + [1 + γb(1− λ)]
[
ln
[
σσ(1− σ)1−σ]+ ln(1 + γb(1− λ)
1 + γb
)]
+γbλ ln
(
γbλ
1 + γb
)
.
(18)
As was the case for the child’s human capital, the mother’s opportunity cost of labor
input in home-production has an ambiguous eﬀect on household’s welfare. We use this
autarky welfare as a basis for exploring the gains from child fostering.
4. A Bargaining Game of Child Fostering
Note that child fostering involves the determination of the fraction of time lf ∈ [0, 1]
the foster child will contribute to home-production of nutrition. Since by assumption
foster parents only cares about the human capital level of their own child, there is a
conﬂict between the immediate beneﬁts of child labor to the receiving household and the
future beneﬁts of child’s human capital to the sending household. It is therefore reason-
able, as a ﬁrst approximation, to approach a traditional child fostering arrangement as
a cooperative game between the sending household and the receiving household. Indeed,
if the receiving household were to uncooperatively determine lf , it will set its level at
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unity, implying that the foster child will have no time for after-school learning activities
such as reading books, reviewing class notes, studying for exams, or doing homework
assignments. Were this situation to materialize, no altruistic mother will voluntarily
send her child out for fostering. Therefore in order for there to be child fostering in this
environment, the biological mother and the foster mother must cooperate to determine lf .
In deciding whether or not to cooperate, mothers will balance the payoﬀ from coop-
eration against the payoﬀ from no cooperation. When there is no cooperation, both
mothers play the strategy ai = 0. We referred to this situation as the autarky. To study
the implications of informal child fostering arrangements for the foster child’s welfare, we
ﬁrst characterize the cooperative game that determines the foster child’s time allocated
to home-production of nutrition in the receiving household. Since this game is played
between a mother who wants to foster her child out and another who want to foster the
child in, it is important to outline the characteristics of the household who gains from
fostering out as well as those of the household who gains from fostering in.
4.1. Who Gains from In-Fostering?
Suppose any household i would consider fostering in a child. Let lf denote the labor input
of the foster child in home-production. For the receiving household i, non-cooperative
choice of the pair (lmi , lbi ) yields the following payoﬀ:
V I(ηi, l
f ) = max
〈lmi ,lbi 〉
V (lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi, l
f), (19)
where
V (lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi, l
f ) = γbλ ln(1− lbi ) + σ [1 + γb(1− λ)] ln [θi + hmi (1− lmi )]
+B1 + (1− σ) [1 + γb(1− λ)] ln
(
lmi + l
b
i + l
f
i
)
, (20)
B1 = ln(1− 2α) + γb [lnD + (1− λ) lnα] ,
and ηi = hmi /θi denotes the opportunity cost of the mother in household i. Denote as
(l˜mi , l˜bi ) the interior solution to the maximization problem in (19):
(l˜mi , l˜
b
i ) = arg max〈lmi ,lbi 〉
V (lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi, l
f), (21)
all i. We prove the following Lemma in Appendix 7.1.
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Lemma 1. Given lf , household i’s labor inputs allocation in home-production is given
as follows:
l˜bi = lˆ
b
i −
γbλ
1 + γb
lf , (22)
l˜mi = lˆ
m
i −
σ [1 + γb(1− λ)]
1 + γb
lf , (23)
where (lˆbi , lˆmi ) denotes the vector of time allocation in autarky, all i.
Lemma 1 states that child fostering partially relieves the mother and her biological
child from participation in home-production. Indeed, as long as lf > 0, we have that
l˜bi < lˆ
b
i and l˜
m
i < lˆ
m
i
all i. From (20), substituting in (23) and (22), re-arranging terms yields
V I(ηi, l
f ) = B¯1 + (1 + γb) ln
(
2 + lf + η−1i
)
+ σ [1 + γb(1− λ)] ln ηiθi, (24)
all i, where
B¯1 = B1 +γbλ ln
(
γbλ
1 + γb
)
+[1 + γb(1− 2λ)]
(
ln
[
σσ(1− σ)1−σ]+ ln [1 + γb(1− λ)
1 + γb
])
.
Given (ηi, lf), it is important to ask which household i gains from in-fostering. We propose
the following deﬁnition of gains from in-fostering:
Definition 1. Household i gains from in-fostering if and only if, given (ηi, lf ), its welfare
from in-fostering is no less than its autarky level:
V I
(
ηi, l
f
)− V¯ (ηi) ≥ 0, (25)
all i.
According to the above deﬁnition, a household that stands to lose from in-fostering
has a level of opportunity cost ηi such that given lf ,
V I
(
ηi, l
f
)− V¯ (ηi) < 0.
Deﬁne the net gain from in-fostering by ϑI(ηi, lf) ≡ V I(ηi, lf)− V¯ (ηi), all i. Then, using
(17) and (24) as well as the deﬁnition of B¯0 and B¯1 respectively, yields this net gain as
follows:
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ϑI
(
ηi, l
f
)
= (1 + γb) ln
[
1 +
(
2 + lf
)
ηi
1 + 2ηi
]
− ln
(
1− α
1− 2α
)
, (26)
all i. Proposition 2 below summarizes the characteristics of a household who gains from
in-fostering:
Proposition 2. Suppose
lf > 2(β − 1), (27)
where
β =
(
1− α
1− 2α
) 1
1+γb
> 1.
If ηi > η¯, where
η¯ =
β − 1
lfi − 2(β − 1)
,
then,
ϑI(ηi, l
f) ≥ 0.
The interested reader can check that unless the foster child’s labor input in home
production lf is suﬃciently large in the sense of condition (27), no household gains from
in-fostering in this environment. Therefore condition (27) implies that child labor is an
essential feature of informal child fostering arrangements. It states that no household will
foster in a child who can not commit a suﬃciently high labor input in home-production.
This is because adult time and child’s time are substitutes in home-production, and par-
ents in each household only care about the human capital level of their biological child.
Condition (27) has implications for the net gain from in-fostering. Indeed, Proposi-
tion 2 implies that in any household, parents’ opportunity cost of labor input in home-
production is the main determinant of the gains from in-fostering. This opportunity cost
is deﬁned by ηi = hmi /θi, all i. In particular, Proposition 2 states that the household
that gains from in-fostering is one where the parents (in this case the mother) faces a
suﬃciently high opportunity cost of labor input in home-production.
4.2. Who Gains from Out-Fostering?
Suppose that parents in household i decides to foster out their child. In this case, the
mother will be left alone to supply labor in home-production (i.e., lbi = 0 and lmi > 0),
in addition to delivering her human capital to ﬁrms. In other words, the only variable
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household i can choose non-cooperatively is the mother time allocation between home-
production and market labor. Therefore deﬁne household i’s welfare from out-fostering
as
V O
(
lf , ηi, ηj
)
= max
〈lmi 〉
V (x), (28)
where x =
(
lmi , l
f , hmi , h
m
j , θi, θj
)
and
V (x) = B−1 + σ ln [θi + (1− lmi )hmi ] + (1− σ)γb(1− λ) ln
(
l˜mj + l˜
b
j + l
f
)
+γbλ ln
(
1− lf)+ σγb(1− λ) ln [θj + (1− l˜mj )hmj ]+ (1− σ) ln(lmi ) (29)
B−1 = γb [lnD + (1− λ) lnα]
and (
l˜mj , l˜
b
j
)
= arg max
〈lmj ,lbj〉
V
(
lmj , l
b
j, h
m
j , θj, l
f
)
all j. Letting l¯mi = argmax〈lmi 〉 V
(
lmi , l
f , hmi , h
m
j , θi, θj
)
, it can be shown that
l¯mi = (1− σ)
(
1 + η−1i
)
, (30)
all i. Therefore, from (29), substituting in (23), (22), (30) and re-arranging terms yields:
V O
(
lf , ηi, ηj
)
= B¯−1 + ln
(
1 + η−1i
)
+ σ [ln(ηiθi) + γb(1− λ) ln(ηjθj)]
+γbλ ln
(
1− lf)+ γb(1− λ) ln (2 + lf + η−1j ) , (31)
all i, where
B¯−1 = B−1 + [1 + γb(1− λ)] ln
[
σσ(1− σ)1−σ]+ γb(1− λ) ln
(
1 + γb(1− λ)
1 + γb
)
.
We propose the following deﬁnition of gains from fostering out a child.
Definition 2. A household i gains from fostering out its child if and only if the welfare
level from following this strategy is no less than its autarky level:
V O
(
lf , ηi, ηj
)− V¯ (ηi) ≥ 0. (32)
Let’s deﬁne household i’s net gain from out-fostering by:
ϑO
(
lf , ηi, ηj
) ≡ V O (lf , ηi, ηj)− V¯ (ηi).
Then using (17) and (31) as well as the deﬁnition of B¯0 and B¯−1 respectively, we obtain
this net gain as follows:
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ϑO
(
lf , ηi, ηj
)
= B¯ + γbλ ln
(
1− lf)− σγb(1− λ) lnhmi + σγb(1− λ) lnhmj
+ ln
(
1 + η−1i
)− (1 + γb) ln (2 + η−1i )+ γb(1− λ) ln (2 + lf + η−1i ) (33)
where
B¯ = − ln(1− α)−
[
γbλ ln
(
γbλ
1 + γb
)
+ ln
(
1 + γb(1− λ)
1 + γb
)]
.
Unlike expression (26) in sub-section 3.2 above, the net gain from out-fostering (33) is
very complex, and thus does not oﬀer a clear picture of who gains from out-fostering. To
clarify this picture, we proceed by numerical simulation.
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Figure 1. Gain from Out-Fostering as Function of hmi and θi See Appendix 7.4
Figure 1 plots the net gain from fostering out a child against the constituents of the
household bargaining power (hmi θi). Three main observations can be drawn from Figure
1:
i) For any pair (i,j) of mothers with equal earning power (i.e., hmi = hmj ), the mother
who receives the highest transfer from her husband will be more likely to foster out,
other things being equal. This result is illustrated by the observation that the net
gain from out-fostering is an increasing function of θi.
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ii) For any pair (i,j) of mothers with equal transfers (i.e., θi = θj), the mother with the
lowest earning power will obtain a higher net gain from fostering out a child. This
result is illustrated by the negative relationship between a mother’s level of human
capital hmi and the level of the net gain from fostering out a child.
iii) Therefore, Figure 1 suggests that for any pair (i,j) of households such that θi = θj
and hmi = hmj , the household that gain from fostering out a child is one where
the mother has a suﬃcently low opportunity cost labor input in home-production
ηi = h
m
i /θi.
4.3. Bargaining over Foster Child’s Labor Input in
Home-Production.
Since bargaining involves two diﬀerent households, we adopt the convention that house-
hold i = 1 is the sending household and household i = 2 is the receiving household.
The object of the bargaining is lf .We want to determine the optimal level, lˆf , of the
fostered child’s labor input in home-production that is agreable to both the sending and
the receiving household. Let us show that child fostering involves a conﬂict between the
immediate beneﬁts of child labor to the receiving household, and the future beneﬁts of
human capital to the sending household. We prove the following lemma in Appendix 7.2.
Lemma 2. The following statements are all true:
i) the net gain from fostering in a child ϑI is increasing in lf ;
ii) if η2 satisﬁes
(1− 3λ)− λ
η2
< 2(β − 1), (34)
then the net gain from fostering out a child ϑO is decreasing in lf ;
iii) in addition, ϑI and ϑO are concave function of lf :
∂2ϑI
∂lf2
< 0 and
∂2ϑO
∂lf2
< 0.
This lemma states that child fostering generates a conﬂict between the sending house-
hold and the receiving household. Therefore we can approach the determination of the
foster child’s labor input in home-production as a cooperative game between the two
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types of households. We structure this cooperative game below.
Deﬁne
Γ
(
lf ; hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2
) ≡ ϑI (hm2 , θ2, lf)× ϑO (lf , hm1 , hm2 , θ1, θ2) ,
where ϑI
(
hm2 , θ2, l
f
)
and ϑO
(
lf , hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2
)
denote respectively the net gains from
fostering in and fostering out, a child and (hm1 , hm2 , θ1, θ2) is the allocation of bargaining
powers between the two types of households.
Lemma 3. Under condition (34), the Nash bargaining function Γ is strictly concave in
lf .
Proof. See appendix 7.3.
Therefore, we can characterize the Nash bargaining solution, χ(.), as follows: lf =
χ (hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2), where
χ (hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2) = argmax〈lf 〉
Γ
(
lf ; hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2
)
(35)
The Nash solution χ(.) to the bargaining problem, if it exists, satisﬁes the following ﬁrst
order necessary and suﬃcient condition:
ϑI(hm2 , θ2, l
f)
ϑO(lf , hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2)
=
(
1− lf) [(2 + lf)hm1 + θ1] (1 + γb)hm2
γb [hm1 l
f + λθ1 − (1− 3λ)hm1 ] [(2 + lf)hm2 + θ2]
. (36)
Since this ﬁrst order condition is non-linear, there is no hope of obtaining a closed form
solution. Therefore to characterize the welfare eﬀects of traditional child fostering ar-
rangements, we simulate the model using speciﬁed parameters.
5. Numerical Simulations of the Model
In this section, we simulate the model to characterize the outcomes of the bargaining game
between the sending household (whose variables are indexed by i = 1) and the receiving
household (whose variable are indexed by i = 2). In all simulation exercises summarized
below, we normalize the receiving household’s socioeconomic status to (θ2, hm2 )=(40, 4).
Another maintained assumption is that household’s time input and the composite market
good have equal shares in the production of the home-made good: σ = 0.5. This is purely
a simplifying assumption made without loss of generality. It allows us to focus exclusively
on the eﬀect of the introduction of a child’s level of nutrition intake as an input into his
human capital. We set the level of parental altruism toward own-child at γb = 0.169,
as in de la Croix and Doepke (2004). The other important exogenous variables are the
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constituents of the sending household’s socioeconomic status (θ1, hm1 ) and the relative
share of child’s schooling time in his human capital λ.
To highlight the role played by nutrition as an input into a child’s human capital level,
we consider three cases. In the ﬁrst case, λ = 0.3, meaning that a child’s level of nutrition
intake is relatively more contributive to his human capital formation than the fraction
of his time allocated to after-school learning activities, such as reviewing daily lessons,
studying for school tests, or doing homework. In the second case λ = 0.5 implying that
child’s nutrition status and time allocated to after-school learning activities have equal
shares in the child’s human capital. Finally, in the third case, λ = 0.7, meaning that a
child’s time allocated to after-school learning activities is relatively more contributive to
his school performance than is his level of nutrition intake.
For each of the three cases above, we also highlight the role played by the sending house-
hold’s relative bargaining power as determined by its socioeconomic status (θ1, hm1 ). We
show how these variables aﬀect the outcomes of the bargaining game. For θ1, we consider
three diﬀerent levels: θ1 < θ2, θ1 = θ2, and θ1 > θ2. For each of these levels, we plot all
bargaining outcomes as a function of hm1 –which is the human capital level of the mother
in the sending-household. Results of all simulation exercises are shown in Appendix 7.4
5.1. Case 1: λ = 0.3
Case 1 corresponds to an environment where a child’s level of nutrition intake is paramount
to his ability to achieve academic excellence in school. In this environment, we ask how
informal child fostering arrangements aﬀect the in-foster’s and household’s outcomes.
5.1.1. Foster Child’s Labor Input and Nutrition Intake
In this subsection, we explore the implications of the optimal child fostering arrangement
for children’s human capital inputs. We ﬁrst ask how this optimal arrangement aﬀects
the supply of child labor by the in-foster. To address this question, we compare the
level of the child’s labor input under the fostering arrangement (lf ) and in absence of it
(lb1)–the autarky situation. Since the receiving household has two residents children, the
in-foster and the biological child, we also compare the former’s labor input to the latter’s
in home-production.
We next ask how the optimal fostering arrangement aﬀects the foster child’s level of
nutrition intake. We address this question by comparing the child’s nutrition level under
the fostering arrangement (cˆf) and in absence of it (cˆb1).
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Recall that in autarky, the child labor input in home-production lb1 is given analytically by
(12). Under child fostering, the biological child labor input lb2 is given analytically by (23)
while the in-foster’s, i.e., lˆf = χ(hm1 , hm2 , θ1, θ2), is solution to (36). Likewise, in autarky
the child nutrition status as determined by the quantity consumed of the home-made
good cb1 is given analytically by (15), while the in-foster’s nutrition status as proxied by
cf is given by
cˆf = α [θ2 + (1− lm2 )hm2 ]σ (L2(a2))1−σ
Results of this numerical simulation are shown in Appendix 7.4.1 under Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that compared to the autarky situation where there is no inter-household
migration of children, informal fostering arrangements increase the incidence of child labor
among in-fosters, causing them to contribute more of their time to household chores than
do biological children. In other words, Figure 2 suggests that, compared to autarky and
to the biological child of the foster family, an in-foster will have less time to allocate
to scholastic activities that enhance academic excellence in school. But it also suggests
that these arrangements raise the level of child’s nutrition compared to autarky. In other
words, informal fostering arrangements help improve the nutrition status of in-fosters,
thus helping them become more alert, and pay more attention in the classroom. How
the in-foster’s level of human capital is aﬀected by these two opposite eﬀects becomes
an important issue to address if one is to gain a better understanding of the eﬀects of
informal fostering arrangements.
5.1.2. Foster Child’s Human Capital and Household’s Welfare
In this subsection, we discuss the implications of the optimal child fostering arrangements
for the in-foster’s level of human capital level, and on household welfare. Observe that
under the child fostering arrangement, the foster child human capital level hˆf is given as:
hˆf = D
(
1− lˆf
)λ⎛⎝ α¯ [1 + γb(1− λ)]
[
θ2 + h
m
2 (2 + lˆ
f)
]
1 + γb
⎞
⎠
1−λ(
1
hm2
)(1−σ)(1−λ)
where α¯ = ασσ(1− σ)1−σ and lf = χ(hm1 , hm2 , θ1, θ2). In autarky where each child resides
with his biological parents, a child’s human capital level is given by (16) above.
Results of this numerical simulation are shown in Appendix 7.4.2 under Figure 3 in the
case where λ = 0.3, which, again is taken to mean that a child’s level of nutrition intake is
paramount to his ability to accumulate human capital. Indeed, a child who is more alert
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in class because of better nutrition may need less studying time in order to pass school
tests. Thus having less time to study or to do one’s homework may not be as strong an
impediment to achievement of good school results when a child has better nutrition status.
Figure 3 reports the implications of the optimal child fostering arrangement on household
and in-foster’s welfare levels. It shows that both the sending, and the receiving, house-
hold are beneﬁted by this arrangement, with the former arguably more better-oﬀ then
the latter. Indeed the sending household’s net gain from out-fostering their child always
exceeds the corresponding ﬁgure for the receiving household (see left-hand side graphs in
Figure 3).
More importantly, Figure 3 shows that compared to autarky, the in-foster’s human capital
level is higher, though always lower than, the corresponding ﬁgure for the foster family’s
biological child. This result is a direct consequence of the important role nutrition plays
as an input into child’s human capital. Figure 3 also shows that the beneﬁcial eﬀects
informal child fostering arrangements have on the in-foster’s human capital rise with the
sending household bargaining power. Note that an increase in θ1 ceteris paribus lowers
the sending household bargaining power, while an increase in hm1 raises it.
5.2. Case 2: λ = 0.5
Case 2 corresponds to an environment where a child’s level of nutrition intake and a
child’s time allocated to after-school learning activities have equal shares in his human
capital formation. In this environment, and as in Case 1 above, we ask how informal
child fostering arrangements aﬀect child’s outcomes and household outcomes.
Results of this numerical simulation are shown in Appendix 7.4.3 under Figure 4 which
is the analog of Figure 2 for Case 2. It shows that the relative role of nutrition in the
child’s human capital accumulation technology has no bearing on the eﬀects informal
child fostering arrangements have on the in-foster’s labor input and nutrition. As in Case
1, the optimal fostering arrangement raises the incidence of child labor for the in-foster,
causing him to contribute more of his time to household chores than does the biological
child. The persistence of this child labor outcome despite a change in the relative contri-
bution of nutrition in the child’s human capital leads us to conclude that the receiving
household’s child labor motive for in-fostering is the main driver of the in-foster’s level of
labor supply, resulting in asymmetric status between the in-foster and the biological child.
Results of the numerical simulation summarizing the implications of the child labor mo-
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tive for in-fostering for the in-foster’s level of human capital are shown in Appendix 7.4.4
under Figure 5.
Compared to Case 1, the child labor motive for in-fostering still causes an asymme-
try between the in-foster’s and the biological child’s human capital outcomes. The latter
still accumulates more human capital than the former. In this case however, and unlike in
Case 1, the sending household’s bargaining power becomes more determinant in ensuring
that placing one’s child under the temporary care of non-parents enhances his human
capital compared to autarky. This is because fostering out a child entails a trade-oﬀ
between after-school learning activities and nutrition. And because after-school learning
activities and nutrition have equal shares in the child’s human capital, parental bargain-
ing power becomes crucial in ensuring that their child is not made worse oﬀ by being
placed under the temporary care of non-parents. Graphs on the right-hand-side of Figure
5 indeed illustrate the crucial role played by the sending household bargaining power.
When that bargaining power is weak, less time for after-school learning activities and
more nutrition than in autarky result in the in-foster accumulating less human capital
compared to autarky, which leaves him worse oﬀ. Yet, compared to autarky, the sending
household is made better oﬀ as illustrated by graphs in the left-hand- side of Figure 5.
This result implies that when the sending household has a low bargaining power, fostering
out a child simply becomes a way to buﬀer the costs of raising children, thus making the
parents better oﬀ, albeit at the expense of their own child’s welfare.
5.3. Case 3. λ = 0.7
In this case, having enough time to review lessons, to study for school tests, do home-
work is paramount to a child’s ability to achieve academic excellence in school. This is
likely to be the case in environment where the quality of in-school education too low,
that additional private learning activities are necessary, for example to allow the child
to have a better preparation for national tests. Nutrition in this case becomes relatively
less important. So what, in this case, are the implications of the optimal child fostering
arrangement?
Figure 6 in Appendix 7.4.5 summarizes our answer to this question. It shows that as
the previous two cases, the child labor motive for in-fostering still causes the foster child
to contribute more time in home-production than does the biological child, thus leaving
the former with less time to allocate to after-school learning activities. As in this case,
schooling time is paramount to the child’s ability to accumulate human capital compared
to nutrition, an important question is whether the sending household has enough bar-
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gaining power to prevent its child being made worse oﬀ by the fostering arrangement.
Appendix 7.4.6 under Figure 7 provides the answer to this question. Expectedly, Figure
7 shows that the sending household’s bargaining power can do nothing to prevent the
foster child being made worse oﬀ by the fostering arrangement.
6. Conclusion
The results presented in this paper suggest that in the absence of well-functioning market
for domestic labor, households enter child fostering arrangements to allow parents to take
advantage of gains from specialization in market activities, by adjusting household size.
Gains from specialization exist when there are inter-household diﬀerences with respect
to parents’ opportunity cost of labor input in home-production. We derived necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for all parties involved to gain from the optimal child fostering
arrangement. We show that placing children under the care of non-parents need not
make these children worse oﬀ, even when adults’ altruistic actions are restricted to own-
children.
The innovative feature of our model responsible for this conclusion is the inclusion of
a child’s nutrition status as a determinant of his ability to achieve academic excellence in
school. Better nutrition, for example, by making the child more alert in school, and by
enhancing his ability to retain more information, can reduce the amount of time needed
to review daily lessons, study for school tests, or do homework. A child with a low nu-
trition status, in contrast, may take more time to study and review due to low alertness
and inability to concentrate. We argued that when nutrition is paramount to a child
school performance, parents can take advantage of the fostering institution to improve
their children academic achievements by fostering them out to households that can oﬀer
them a better nutrition status.
We obtained these results in a context where Hamilton’s rule applies, causing altruis-
tic actions by parents to be restricted to own-children. We also implicitly assumed that
school enrolment is mandatory, an institution increasingly adopted by all countries in-
cluding poorer ones. This assumption only serves the purpose of establishing the fact that
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asymmetry in human capital outcomes between a biological child and an in-foster may
still exist despite equal enrolment. Indeed we show that when such asymmetries exist,
they are fully explained by diﬀerences in time allocated to after-school learning activities,
such as studying for school tests, reading books and magazines to improve communica-
tions skills, etc. Because of the operation of Hamilton’s rule, our model predicts that a
biological child will always accumulate a higher level of human capital than the in-foster.
Yet under certain conditions, the in-foster accumulates more human capital compared to
the autarky situation where there is own-parent residence for all children. Our analysis
therefore suggests that Hamilton’s rule need not provide a motive for public policy action
to regulate informal child fostering arrangements.
Consistent with reported cross-country disparities in the welfare eﬀects of informal
child fostering arrangements (Ainsworth 1996, Zimmerman 2003, Fafchamps and Wahba
2006, and Akresh 2009), our analysis suggests that these disparities can be explained by
diﬀerences in the quality of the formal education system. In general, our analysis rein-
forces the growing consensus in the existing literature (Zimmerman 2003; Akresh 2009;
Serra 2009) that informal child fostering arrangements enhance, rather than impede, de-
velopment.
7. Appendix
In this section, we provide proofs for most of the results obtained in the main text.
7.1. Proof of Lemma 1
We know that (l˜mi , l˜bi ) are solution to the maximisation problem (21):(
l˜mi , l˜
b
i
)
= arg max
〈lmi ,lbi 〉
V
(
lmi , l
b
i , h
m
i , θi, l
f
)
.
By solving the ﬁrst order condition of this problem,it can be shown that l˜mi and l˜bi are
respectively given by:
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l˜bi =
[1 + γb(1− 2λ)]− γbλ
(
η−1i + l
f
)
1 + γb
,
l˜mi =
[(1− σ)(1 + γb) + σγbλ]
(
1 + η−1i
)− σ [1 + γb(1− λ)] (1 + lf)
1 + γb
,
Therefore it obvious appears that
l˜bi = lˆ
b
i −
γbλ
1 + γb
lf ,
l˜mi = lˆ
m
i −
σ [1 + γb(1− λ)]
1 + γb
lf ,
7.2. Proof of Lemma 2
i) The result of this statement is obtained by diﬀerentiating the net gain from foster
in a child with respect to lf . Indeed, the net gain from foster in a child is given by:
ϑI
(
ηi, l
f
)
= (1 + γb) ln
[
1 + (2 + lf )ηi
1 + 2ηi
]
− ln
(
1− α
1− 2α
)
.
Therefore, diﬀerentiating with respect to lf yields:
∂ϑI
(
ηi, l
f
)
∂lf
=
(1 + γb)ηi
1 + (2 + lf ) ηi
> 0.
ii) the net gain from foster out a child is given by the following relation:
ϑO
(
lf , ηi, ηj
)
= B¯ − σγb(1− λ) lnhmi + σγb(1− λ) lnhmj + ln
(
1 + η−1i
)
+γbλ ln
(
1− lf)− (1 + γb) ln (2 + η−1i )+ γb(1− λ) ln (2 + lf + η−1i ) .
Therefore, diﬀerentiating with respect to lf yields:
∂ϑO(lf , η1, η2)
∂lf
= −γb
[
lf − (1− 3λ) + λη−12
(1− lf) (2 + lf + η−12 )
]
.
Let us assume that
(1− 3λ)− λ
η2
< 2(β − 1).
This unequality is also equivalent to
(1− 3λ)− λ
η2
< lf ,
since lf > 2(β − 1)according to (27).In other words, the numerator of the fraction
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containing in the above expression of the ﬁrst derivative of the net gain from foster
out a child is a positive one. It therefore appears obvious to remark that this last
unequality implies that:
∂ϑO
(
lf , η1, η2
)
∂lf
< 0.
iii) The second derivative respectively of ϑO and ϑI with respect to lf are:
∂2ϑO
(
lf , η1, η2
)
∂lf2
= −γb
[
λ
(1− lf)2 +
1− λ(
2 + lf + η−12
)2
]
< 0,
∂2ϑI
(
η2, l
f
)
∂lf2
= − (1 + γb)η
2
2
1 + (2 + lf) η2
< 0.
These results imply that ϑO and ϑI are concave function of lf
7.3. Proof of Lemma 3
The Nash Bargaining function is deﬁned by
Γ
(
lf ; hm1 , h
m
2 , θ1, θ2
) ≡ ϑI (hm2 , θ2, lf)× ϑO (lf , hm1 , hm2 , θ1, θ2) ,
Its second derivative with respect to lf is given by the following relation:
∂2Γ
∂lf2
=
∂2ϑI
∂lf2
× ϑO (lf , θ1, θ2)+ ∂2ϑO
∂lf2
ϑI
(
η2, l
f
)
+
∂ϑO
∂lf
× ∂ϑ
I
∂lf
.
Since ϑO and ϑI are positive values, the quantity
∂2Γ
∂lf2
=
∂2ϑI
∂lf2
× ϑO (lf , θ1, θ2)+ ∂2ϑO
∂lf2
ϑI
(
η2, l
f
)
is therefore a negative one according the result (iii) of Lemma 2. Elsewhere, we know
that under (34), the ﬁrst derivative of ϑO with respect to lf is negative. These result lead
us to conclude that
∂2Γ
∂lf2
< 0.
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7.4. Results of the numerical simulation
In this sub-section we present the graphs pertaining to the numerical simulation of the
model. There are three cases: (i) λ = 0.3; (ii) λ = 0.5; (iii) λ = 0.7.
7.4.1. Incidence of Child Labor and Child’s Nutrition for λ = 0.3
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Figure 2.a. θ1 < θ2
0.5 1 1.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
h1
m
C
hi
ld
,
s
 N
ut
rit
io
n
Foster Child,s Nutrition Compared to Autarky
 
 
0.5 1 1.5
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
h1
m
C
hi
ld
 L
ab
or
Figure 2.b: θ1 = θ2
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Figure 2.c: θ1 > θ2
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Figure 2. Foster child’s labor supply and nutrition status for λ = 0.3
The blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the orange-colored curve,
the biological child’s variables. In all graphs, the black-colored dotted curve represents
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence. To uncover
the eﬀects of fostering arrangements on the foster child’s welfare, we contrast the fostering
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outcomes with the autarky outcomes.
7.4.2. Gains from the Fostering Arrangement for λ = 0.3
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Figure 3.a. θ1 < θ2
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Figure 3.b. θ1 = θ2
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Figure 3.c. θ1 > θ2
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Figure 3. Foster child’s human capital and household’s welfare when λ = 0.3.
The blue-colored curve of the left-hand side graphs represents the sending household’s
variables, and the orange-colored curve, the receiving household’s variables. As for the
right-hand side graphs, the blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the
orange-colored curve, the biological child’s variables, and the black-colored dotted curve,
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence.
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7.4.3. Incidence of Child Labor and Child’s Nutrition for λ = 0.5
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Figure 4.a. θ1 < θ2
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Figure 4.b: θ1 = θ2
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Figure 4.c: θ1 > θ2
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Figure 4. Foster child’s labor supply and nutrition status when λ = 0.5.
The blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the orange-colored curve,
the biological child’s variables. In all graphs, the black-colored dotted curve represents
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence. To uncover
the eﬀects of fostering arrangements on the foster child’s welfare, we contrast the fostering
outcomes with the autarky outcomes.
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7.4.4. Gains from the Fostering Arrangement for λ = 0.5
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Figure 5.a. θ1 < θ2
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Figure 5.b. θ1 = θ2
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Figure 5.c. θ1 > θ2
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Figure 5. Foster child’s human capital and household’s welfare when λ = 0.5.
The blue-colored curve of the left-hand side graphs represents the sending household’s
variables, and the orange-colored curve, the receiving household’s variables. As for the
right-hand side graphs, the blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the
orange-colored curve, the biological child’s variables, and the black-colored dotted curve,
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence.
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7.4.5. Incidence of Child Labor and Child’s Nutrition for λ = 0.7
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Figure 6.a. θ1 < θ2
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Figure 6.b: θ1 = θ2
 
 
f
Autarky
b
0.5 1 1.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
h1
m
C
hi
ld
,
s
 N
ut
rit
io
n
 
 
Foster
Autarky
0.5 1 1.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
h1
m
C
hi
ld
 L
ab
or
Figure 6.c: θ1 > θ2
 
 
f
Autarky
b
0.5 1 1.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
h1
m
C
hi
ld
,
s
 N
ut
rit
io
n
 
 
Foster
Autarky
Figure 6. Foster child’s labor supply and nutrition when λ = 0.7.
The blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the orange-colored curve,
the biological child’s variables. In all graphs, the black-colored dotted curve represents
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence. To uncover
the eﬀects of fostering arrangements on the foster child’s welfare, we contrast the fostering
outcomes with the autarky outcomes.
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7.4.6. Gains from the Fostering Arrangement for λ = 0.7
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Figure 7.a. θ1 < θ2
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Figure 7.b. θ1 = θ2
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Figure 7.c. θ1 > θ2
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Figure 7. Foster child’s human capital and household welfare when λ = 0.7.
The blue-colored curve of the left-hand side graphs represents the sending household’s
variables, and the orange-colored curve, the receiving household’s variables. As for the
right-hand side graphs, the blue-colored curve represents the foster child’s variables, the
orange-colored curve, the biological child’s variables, and the black-colored dotted curve,
the foster child’s variables in autarky corresponding to own-parent residence.
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